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Domestic bank intermediation in emerging  
market economies during the crisis:  
locally owned versus foreign-owned banks 
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1. Introduction   
This paper discusses how the global financial crisis of 2008–09 affected banks operating in 
emerging market economies (EMEs) and how far it led them to change key aspects of their 
business models. Aspects of particular interest include: changes in bank funding (maturity 
and sources of funding); changes in bank lending (in terms of loan maturities; required 
collateral; types of borrowers; etc); and changes in liquidity management (evidence of a 
build-up of liquid assets; shortening of lending maturities, etc). The paper also looks at 
evidence of different response patterns between foreign and local banks in EMEs during the 
crisis. The analysis is based almost entirely on central bank responses to a BIS 
questionnaire prepared for the BIS meeting of Deputy Governors of emerging market 
economies (28–29 January 2010, Basel). The aim is to provide an up-to-date assessment of 
key changes in domestic bank intermediation in EMEs resulting from the spillovers of the 
global financial crisis of 2008–09.  
The main finding is that, despite the great variety of financial intermediation and bank 
ownership structures in EMEs, by and large, banks adjusted to the crisis as in a textbook 
scenario. On the funding side, they reduced their reliance on wholesale markets and 
increased their efforts to attract retail deposits. On the lending side, they reduced the growth 
of new loans to firms and households, shifted towards less risky types of loans and increased 
their holdings of government bonds. On the liquidity side, banks shortened the maturity of 
their assets, relied less on the interbank market and started doing more business with central 
banks.  
Foreign and domestic banks broadly adjusted to the crisis in the same way. Initially, there 
were some differences in the speed of adjustment, but eventually, both domestic and foreign 
banks moved in the same direction and adjusted their funding, lending and liquidity 
operations to a similar extent. The funding model seems to have mattered more for 
adjustment than bank ownership. 
This paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 reviews the structure of financial 
intermediation in EMEs. Section 3 analyses the structure of bank funding before and during 
the 2008–09 crisis, and section 4 looks at changes in bank lending patterns. Section 5 
evaluates the responses to the crisis by the domestic and foreign-owned banks and 
discusses the incentives for establishing subsidiaries versus branches after the crisis. 
                                                  
1   The author thanks Agne Subelyte for research assistance and Stephen Cecchetti, Ramon Moreno, Haibin Zhu 
and participants of the BIS meeting of Deputy Governors of emerging market economies for comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper. 32  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
2.  Structure of financial intermediation in EMEs  
To understand how banks in different EMEs reacted to the crisis, it is useful to start by 
analysing the structure of domestic financial intermediation. The relative importance of banks 
differs greatly both within and among emerging market regions. This section looks at: the 
relative size of banks, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), equity markets and bond 
markets in EMEs; the ownership structure of domestic banking systems; and the legal form 
of incorporation of foreign banks’ affiliates (ie subsidiaries vs branches). Each of these 
elements is potentially relevant for explaining the observed trends in financial intermediation 
during the crisis.  
For instance, banks were generally more affected than NBFIs by the crisis so, other things 
equal, one would expect countries with larger non-bank financial sectors to have experienced 
fewer disruptions in domestic financial intermediation. Similarly, one would expect countries 
with more developed domestic bond markets to have experienced less financial market 
upheaval than those relying mostly on international bond markets.  
Regarding the ownership structure, one view is that problems in international banks’ 
domestic markets inevitably led banks to withdraw from emerging markets. A classic 
example is the large-scale withdrawal of Japanese banks from emerging Asia during the 
1997–98 crisis. When Japanese banks experienced problems in their domestic market as a 
result of declines in equity and real estate prices, they had to shrink their balance sheets to 
maintain their capital adequacy requirements. The resulting pullback provided a major 
impetus to the crisis that was unfolding in emerging Asia at the time.  
A competing view is that international banks consider some emerging markets of strategic 
importance for their overall business strategy. Therefore, it is in their vital interest to support 
operations in these markets during the crisis (de Haas and Lelyveld (2004), EBRD (2009)). 
The case in point is banks from smaller western European countries (eg Austria, Belgium) 
that established a dense network of subsidiaries in central and eastern Europe (CEE). These 
subsidiaries generated the lion’s share of profits at the group level in the second half of the 
2000s, and were therefore vitally important for the financial performance of parent banks.  
Yet another view is that, during periods of crisis, lending by state-owned banks tends to be 
less procyclical than lending by foreign and private domestic banks. For instance, during the 
crises in emerging Asia and Latin America in the 1990s, state-owned banks expanded credit 
faster (or cut credit to a smaller extent) than domestic and foreign-owned private banks 
(Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001)). A similar experience was reported in some EMEs during the 
current crisis. 
Finally, the legal form of incorporation of foreign banks’ affiliates may matter during a crisis. 
Foreign bank affiliates are often of small importance from the parent banks’ perspective, but 
systemically important for the host country. One issue that arises in this context is how the 
host country authorities might deal with the loss of liquidity and disruptions in the domestic 
payment system if the parent institution decides to cut back support for such an affiliate. 
Other things equal, one would expect the authorities in countries where foreign banks are 
present as subsidiaries to be better able to preserve liquidity and stability, because 
subsidiaries are standalone entities with their own capital and are supervised by both host 
country supervisor and, on a consolidated basis, by the parent’s supervisory authority.  BIS Papers No 54  33
 
 
Banks versus other financial intermediaries  
Banks in EMEs remain much larger than NBFIs and account, on average, for 70–80% of total 
financial sector assets (Graph 1).
2 However, there are large differences across countries. In 
Latin America, for instance, the share of banks in combined assets of banks and NBFIs 
ranged from around 50% (Chile and Colombia) to 98% (Argentina), while in other EMEs it 
ranged from 65% (Israel, Korea, Malaysia) to 95% or higher (Hong Kong SAR, the 
Philippines, South Africa). 
The relative shares of banks and NBFIs were stable throughout the latest crisis. However, 
there were some exceptions: banks in India and Peru increased their relative share of total 
assets by 7 percentage points (pp) between 2006 and 2009; and in Hungary and Poland by 
3–4 pp. Banks “retreated” compared to NBFIs on a larger scale only in Israel (by 5 pp), 
Colombia (3 pp) and Mexico (2 pp).  
Graph 1 
Banks vs NBFIs 













Source: Central bank questionnaires. 
 
Differences in the structure of financial intermediation are even larger when stock and bond 
markets are considered. At end-2007, when EMEs were still unaffected by the crisis, stock 
market capitalisation was close to or higher than the local GDP in more than half of EMEs in 
our sample of 22 countries (Graph 2). Stock markets were also larger than the local banking 
system – in some cases two–three times so – in Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Peru, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and South Africa. Many countries, especially in emerging 
Asia, Brazil, the Czech Republic and Hungary, also had fairly large local bond markets, 
ranging in size from 50% to over 100% of local GDP. Overall, countries in emerging Asia 
stood out in terms of the size and diversity of their financial systems, followed by Israel, 
Chile, South Africa, Brazil, central European countries and Saudi Arabia (Graph 2).  
                                                  
2   Unless otherwise noted, regional figures in the text, graphs and tables refer to simple averages of countries in 
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(emerging Asia); Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru (Latin America); the Czech Republic, 




Structure of financial intermediation, 2007 
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Note: AR = Argentina; BR = Brazil; CL = Chile; CN = China; CO = Colombia; CZ = Czech Republic; HK = Hong 
Kong SAR; HU = Hungary; IL = Israel; IN = India; KR = Korea; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; PE = Peru; PH = 
Philippines; PL = Poland; SA = Saudi Arabia; SG = Singapore; TR = Turkey; TH = Thailand; ZA = South Africa. 
Source: Central bank questionnaires. 
 
These data suggest that many EMEs are no longer quite “emerging” in terms of the size and 
diversity of their financial sectors. Although the crisis had a huge impact on stock markets in 
many EMEs – equity prices fell by 20–40% between end-2007 and end-2009 – other 
segments of EMEs’ financial sectors were unaffected or expanded.  
The data in Graph 2 also show that the financial sectors of the majority of emerging market 
countries can no longer be characterised as bank-centred: NBFIs, equity and bond markets 
match or exceed the size of the local banking sector in many EMEs. A comprehensive 
assessment of the impact of the crisis on financial intermediation in EMEs would therefore 
need to go beyond the narrow banking sector, on which the rest of this paper will focus. 
Ownership structure of banks 
EMEs also differ considerably in terms of the ownership structure of their banks. Banking 
systems in Asia have, on average, a fairly balanced ownership structure (Graph 3). 
Compared to other emerging market regions, Asia also stands out in terms of the relative 
importance of state-owned banks and other banking institutions (cooperative banks, credit 
unions, etc). However, this is mainly due to the large size of the state and cooperative 
sectors in China and India. In Latin America, foreign and private domestic banks each 
account for about 40% of banking system assets, and state-owned banks account for the 
remaining 20%. In CEE, foreign-owned banks dominate, accounting for over 60% of total BIS Papers No 54  35
 
 
banking system assets on average, and often much more in individual countries. In other 
EMEs – Israel, Saudi Arabia and South Africa – private domestic banks are dominant, 
accounting for 80% of total assets, with the remainder split between foreign and state-owned 
banks.  
Graph 3 
Ownership structure of emerging market banks, 2009 
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Source: Central bank questionnaires. 
 
Again, regional averages mask considerable country differences. What is striking when one 
looks at country detail is how diverse bank ownership in EMEs has become. With the 
exception of the Czech Republic and Saudi Arabia, where foreign and private domestic 
banks account for, respectively, 96% and 98% of total banking system assets, different forms 
of ownership are well represented in almost all EMEs. For instance, private domestic banks 
account for more than 50% of total assets in Brazil, Colombia, Israel, Malaysia, Peru, the 
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey, and foreign-owned banks account for more 
than 50% of total assets in Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Mexico, Peru, Poland and Singapore 
(Appendix Graph A1). State-owned banks have a strong presence (more than 30% of total 
assets) in Argentina, Brazil, China, India and Korea. The ownership structure of banks in 
EMEs has been fairly stable since 2006. This contrasts with developments in the 1990s and 
the first half of the 2000s, when major changes were taking place in the structure of the 
banking industry in EMEs (see Mihaljek (2006), Turner (2008)).  
Regarding the legal form of foreign banks’ presence in EMEs, subsidiaries are dominant in 
Latin America and CEE, while branches account for about two thirds of foreign banks’ assets 
in Asia and other EMEs (Graph 4). In Colombia, Malaysia, Mexico and Peru, foreign banks 
operate only as subsidiaries, while in China, India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa they 
operate only as branches. Unlike the overall ownership structure, the legal form of foreign 
banks’ operations has changed in several EMEs since 2006: the relative share of branches 
increased by 15 pp in Korea, 8 pp in Hungary, 4 pp in Israel and 3 pp in Poland. On the other 
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Source: Central bank questionnaires. 
3.   Bank funding  
In the run-up to the latest crisis, the funding of banks in EMEs was characterised by two main 
trends: first, domestic deposits were generally growing more slowly than bank lending, 
resulting in rising loan to deposit ratios; and second, banks in EMEs were increasingly relying 
on foreign sources in order to fund the rapid expansion of credit. These trends were 
particularly pronounced in CEE, parts of Latin America, South Africa and Korea. 
With the onset of the crisis in October 2008, both domestic and foreign sources of bank 
funding in EMEs largely evaporated. Growth rates of domestic funding plunged from 15–25% 
year-on-year in 2007–08, to 0–7% in 2009 (Graph 5, left-hand panel). The retrenchment in 
foreign funding was even more dramatic, especially in Latin America and CEE (right-hand 
panel). The banking systems in virtually all EMEs recorded negative growth of foreign 
funding for the full year 2009. 
Among domestic sources of funding, both deposit growth and market-based funding slowed 
sharply in 2009 (Graph 6).
3 This is not surprising in view of the severity of the real and 
financial shocks that hit the EMEs in the first half of 2009: the collapse in exports depressed 
the growth of customer deposits (left-hand panel), while disruptions in local interbank and 
securities markets led to the sharp fall in domestic market funding (right-hand panel). During 
the second half of 2009, as global and local financial markets gradually recovered, banks in 
several Asian countries, including China, India, the Philippines and Thailand, started again to 
issue securities in domestic markets, mostly short-term money market instruments.  
                                                  
3   Domestic market-based funding includes here borrowing from other domestic financial institutions and bonds 




Funding of emerging market banks 


















































Source: Central bank questionnaires. 
 
In relative terms, the shock to deposits was generally stronger than the one to domestic 
funding. As indicated in Graph 7, the share of deposits in domestic liabilities decreased in all 
emerging market regions with the exception of Asia, while the share of domestic money and 
bond market funding increased slightly in three out of four regions in 2009 compared to 2006. 
The situation with foreign funding was similar. Short-term liabilities plunged everywhere in 
2009, recording average growth rates from –10% to –40% year-on-year (Graph 8, left-hand 
panel). Long-term liabilities dropped precipitously in CEE, where banks had for years relied 
on longer-term funding provided by international banks, and in Latin America, especially 
Brazil and Chile (right-hand panel). Long-term liabilities increased modestly only in emerging 
Asia. These developments reflected disruptions in global money markets on the one hand, 
and a temporary halt in cross-border credit flows to EMEs on the other.  
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Source: Central bank questionnaires. 
 
Disturbances in the international money and bond markets seem to have had a bigger impact 
on the composition of foreign funding than disruptions in cross-border bank flows. As 
indicated in Graph 9, with the exception of Colombia, Mexico and Peru, the share of cross-
border bank funding in total foreign liabilities was still higher in 2009 than in 2006, while the 
share of international money market instruments and bonds issued by emerging market 
banks was generally lower (Peru was a notable exception in bond issuance). The funding of 
emerging market banks by other foreign financial institutions – as well as from other foreign 
sources – was lower as a percentage of foreign liabilities in almost all the countries in 2009 
compared with 2006. 
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Note: BK = cross-border loans provided by foreign banks; FI = loans provided by other foreign financial 
institutions; MM = international money market instruments issued by emerging market banks; IB = international 
bonds issued by emerging market banks; OT = other sources of foreign funding. 
Source: Central bank questionnaires. 
 
Central banks clearly identified problems in domestic and foreign funding in their papers and 
questionnaire responses prepared for the BIS meeting of Deputy Governors of emerging 
market economies. For instance, although Brazilian banks do not rely on foreign deposits for 
funding, they usually turn to international banks for credit lines for exporters. Their access to 
export credit lines was significantly restrained for some time during the crisis, prompting the 
central bank to provide a trade credit facility to banks until the access to foreign sources of 
credit gradually resumed.  
In Mexico, some smaller- and medium-sized banks launched aggressive campaigns to 
increase funding from retail depositors by offering very attractive interest rates, while others 
expanded their branch network. Some Mexican banks also increased the proportion of 
liabilities held as liquid assets, while others called back some assets and reduced their 
lending commitments as a temporary measure to get through the crisis. Competition for 
deposits also strengthened in Hong Kong SAR, Korea and Hungary. In Poland, banks 
replaced maturing domestic interbank exposures with borrowing from foreign banks (mainly 
parent companies), and made efforts to raise more stable domestic sources such as deposits 
from non-financial clients (mainly households). This was, however, accompanied by a 
“deposit price war” that negatively affected banks’ financing costs and increased pressure on 
their interest margins. 
Despite evidence of funding pressures in a large number of EMEs, many central banks felt 
that the financial crisis had no major impact on the funding strategies of banks operating in 
their domestic market. The main reason for this is that many emerging market banks do not 
rely extensively on either domestic or foreign market funding – they generally had a sufficient 
pool of local deposits to fund loans to their clients. As shown in Graph 10, roughly two thirds 
of EMEs in our sample had loan to deposit ratios below 100% in 2009, despite a widespread 
increase in these ratios since 2006. Another reason is that local interbank markets by and 
large continued to function normally through the crisis – although, admittedly, these markets 
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1 Total loans as a percentage of total deposits. For Singapore, domestic banks only. 
Sources: Central bank questionnaires; BIS calculations. 
 
Another source of funding – the securitisation of bank loans – was also affected by the crisis. 
In most EMEs, securitisation was not widespread, but plans for its development were well-
advanced in some countries prior to the crisis. In India, securitisation was mostly based on 
retail loans and was not too complex. With the crisis, securitisation decreased in volume, but 
was expected to resume in the future. In China, there were several pilot programmes for the 
securitisation of bank loans. However, with loan to deposit ratios of around 60%, the 
motivation for securitisation was relatively low. The central bank nevertheless promoted the 
development of a legal infrastructure and regulatory framework for securitisation because of 
concerns that banks might start moving riskier loans off their balance sheets by selling them 
to trust companies; these had already been in trouble several times in the past decade 
because of investments that were too risky. In Saudi Arabia, the authorities were approached 
by the banking industry on the issue of securitisation prior to the crisis. However, with bank 
loans already growing at annual rates of more than 25%, the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Authority decided that it was not in the interest of financial stability to provide a further boost 
to credit growth by developing a framework for securitisation. By contrast, the authorities in 
South Africa gave a push to securitisation by lowering the loan to value ratio for mortgage 
loans during the crisis. 
4.  Bank lending  
Before the crisis spread from advanced to emerging market economies in October 2008, 
private sector credit had expanded rapidly in most EMEs. The expansion was particularly 
pronounced in CEE, Brazil, Chile, Korea and South Africa. Credit stagnated or decreased as 
a percentage of GDP only in a few Asian and Latin American economies (Graph 11). 
The great credit expansion resulted from a combination of cyclical, structural and policy 
factors that were in place from 2002 onwards. Low real interest rates and the strong growth 
of the global economy were the key cyclical factors. Rapid financial sector development and 
growing economic and financial integration of EMEs with advanced economies were the 
major structural forces. More disciplined macroeconomic policies and greater emphasis on BIS Papers No 54  41
 
 
financial stability in EMEs were also contributing elements. Together, these factors provided 
incentives for portfolio diversification by global investors and led to a surge in capital flows to 
EMEs, which funded much of the credit expansion (Mihaljek (2009)). In addition, the balance 
sheets of commercial banks in some EMEs with fixed exchange rates expanded as a result 
of prolonged foreign exchange (FX) intervention by central banks resisting currency 
appreciation. 
Graph 11 
Domestic bank credit to the private sector, end-2002 to August 2008 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
Following the onset of the crisis in the main financial centres in August 2007, total assets and 
loans of banks in most EMEs began to slow down (Graph 12). As the crisis spread in 
October 2008, credit growth decelerated sharply. Apart from some Asian and Latin American 
countries, most EMEs recorded negative credit growth rates in 2009. It is striking, for 
instance, how similar the average rate of decline was in CEE and Latin America (right-hand 
panel). 
Graph 12 
Total assets and loans of banks in EMEs  
Year-on-year growth rates, in per cent 



























Source: Central bank questionnaires. 
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Corporate credit growth decelerated sharply in all emerging market regions in 2009 
(Graph 13, centre panel). The slowdown in household lending was pronounced in CEE and 
Latin America, and more moderate in Asia and other EMEs (left-hand panel). Lending to the 
public sector increased in CEE, and in particular in Latin America, while in Asia and other 
EMEs, public sector lending decreased (right-hand panel). 
In terms of the currency composition of loans, foreign currency loans decreased much faster 
than domestic currency loans in 2009 (Graph 14). While the rates of decrease across regions 
were quite similar in 2009, it is interesting to note that foreign currency lending in CEE 
increased during 2008, despite the ongoing crisis in many western European countries, 
where most banks operating in CEE have headquarters. As a result, foreign currency loans 
accounted for about 35% of total outstanding domestic bank credit in CEE in 2009, 
compared with 15–18% in other emerging market regions. This was a major source of 
vulnerability during the crisis, especially since a quarter of foreign currency loans were taken 
by households, which in most cases do not have foreign currency income and cannot hedge 
exchange rate risk due to the lack of hedging instruments. One should note, however, that 
foreign currency lending was more a question of banking product development than a 
problem of currency substitution induced by macroeconomic instability, although some 
macroeconomic developments did play a role in the spread of foreign currency lending, 
including fiscal deficits in Hungary, which kept domestic interest rates high. 
Graph 13 
Domestic credit growth  
Year-on-year growth rates, in per cent 

























Source: Central bank questionnaires. 
There were also some significant changes in the composition of bank assets other than 
loans. Holdings of long-term securities fell sharply in CEE and Latin America, and increased 
in Asia and other EMEs in 2009 (Appendix Graph A2, left-hand panel). In CEE, the reduction 
in long-term bond holdings was limited to domestic corporate and government bonds, while 
foreign bond holdings increased sharply (Appendix Graph A3). Banks in Asia and other 
EMEs also increased their foreign bond holdings in 2009. In addition, banks in most EMEs 
increased their holdings of short-term securities (Appendix Graph A2, right-hand panel). 
Central bank contributions to the meeting provided further detail on these developments and 
on changes in banks’ behaviour during the crisis. In Hungary, India, Korea, Singapore, South 
Africa, Thailand and Turkey, credit growth slowed sharply as credit demand fell and banks 
tightened their credit standards and price and non-price credit terms. In Argentina and the 
Philippines, the composition of domestic credit shifted from the household sector before the 
crisis towards the corporate sector in 2009. In South Africa, in contrast, corporate lending 
decreased more than loans to households due to a sharp contraction in output. China was an 
important exception: the growth rate of total loans doubled in 2009 to 30% year-on-year by 
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Source: Central bank questionnaires. 
 
Banks in several countries (including Brazil, the Czech Republic and South Africa) shortened 
the maturity of lending and often increased voluntarily their holdings of statutory liquid assets. 
This was also the case with commercial banks in India and Turkey, which significantly 
increased their holdings of government securities. In Korea, banks expanded their short-term 
placements in money market funds.  
In Poland, there was a significant disruption of the domestic interbank deposit market. In 
response, banks limited the growth of credit to the economy (especially the non-financial 
corporate sector), raised the share of highly marketable treasury securities in their assets, 
and increased holdings of central bank bills, current account balances, and deposits at the 
central bank. 
5.  Domestic versus foreign-owned banks  
Reflecting the diversity of ownership forms and market positions of banks in EMEs, the 
responses of domestic and foreign-owned banks to the crisis have been quite varied and 
cannot be easily categorised.  
A number of central banks in countries with both low and high shares of foreign bank 
ownership (eg Brazil, Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and 
Thailand) reported that there have been no major differences in the reactions of domestic 
and foreign-owned banks during the crisis. For instance, South Africa’s largest foreign-owned 
bank (which is the second largest bank in the country) responded to the crisis in a similar 
way to the domestic banks. In Thailand, both foreign and local banks became more cautious 
in lending to risky businesses (especially small- and medium-sized enterprises, which was 
also the case in Korea); and reduced their off-balance sheet transactions, especially in FX 
derivatives. The main difference was that foreign-owned banks reduced household loans and 
increased secured lending slightly, while the Thai banks increased household loans and kept 
secured lending unchanged.  
Similarly, in Hong Kong SAR, both local and overseas banks cut back loans to the corporate 
and household sectors sharply after the onset of the crisis. One difference was that locally 
incorporated banks were more aggressive in securing stable funding in the retail market by 
offering more attractive time deposit rates. In Singapore, some foreign banks cut back 44  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
lending to non-core customers and complex trading activities as part of restructuring 
measures undertaken by parent banks worldwide. Overall, however, these cutbacks were not 
significant. In Saudi Arabia, liquidity from head offices decreased temporarily for some 
foreign bank branches, which restricted their usual role in interbank funding and lending to 
various sectors in the economy. Nevertheless, one foreign bank branch was able to issue an 
Islamic bond (sukuk) to fund its Saudi assets during the crisis.  
Among the countries with a moderate share of foreign-owned banks (ie 15–30% of total 
banking sector assets), foreign-owned banks generally reduced domestic credit faster than 
private domestic banks, for instance in Argentina, Turkey, and among smaller foreign banks 
in South Africa. Similarly, foreign-owned banks in Colombia were quite procyclical in 
consumer lending. In Argentina and Turkey, the decline in credit by the private banks – both 
foreign and domestic – was partly offset by increased lending by the state-owned banks.  
The funding responses of private domestic banks and foreign-owned banks also differed in 
this group of countries. In Turkey, for instance, foreign-owned banks reduced interbank 
borrowing much more than private domestic banks (this was also the case in the 
Philippines); they issued subordinated debt to offset the decline in cross-border loans and 
significantly increased the amount of funds raised from repo transactions, while the private 
domestic banks reduced their funding through repos.  
It is interesting to note that reactions to the crisis differed even among some foreign-owned 
banks. In South Africa, smaller foreign-owned banks whose parents were more exposed to 
the global financial turmoil were cut off from head office funding and had to reduce their 
exposures to the corporate sector. If the news about their foreign owners was bad, they tried 
to emphasise how they were de-linked and independent; if the news was good, they stressed 
the willingness of their parents to stand by them.  
Among the countries where foreign-owned banks play a key role in domestic financial 
intermediation, the question of domestic versus foreign-owned banks was less relevant than 
the question whether foreign banks helped to maintain financial stability through the crisis. 
On this issue, experiences varied. In Mexico, some subsidiaries – especially those whose 
parents were in trouble – initially reduced credit faster than other banks, although later on, 
domestic banks also cut back their lending. Many foreign-owned banks in Mexico ended up 
lending to parent banks.
4 Some parent banks also transferred loans to large Mexican firms 
from the books of the head office to the books of the subsidiaries in order to reduce the head 
office leverage. Foreign bank subsidiaries also reduced their risk positions and trading 
activity in the FX and sovereign debt markets.  
In contrast to Mexico, parent banks fulfilled their support function in Hungary during the 
crisis, with no signs of withdrawing funds from their subsidiaries. In addition to stabilising the 
position of subsidiaries, parent banks provided them with FX funding and increased the role 
of intragroup foreign currency swaps. On the other hand, domestically owned banks received 
government loans to strengthen their liquidity position during the crisis, and the central bank 
provided FX liquidity under its swap facility. Both local and foreign-owned banks reduced 
their profit targets for 2009, started competing for deposits, and cut back loans to risky 
industries such as construction. 
The experience of Poland was somewhere between these extremes. Foreign-owned banks 
generally reduced corporate credit and expanded household credit faster than Polish-owned 
banks. They kept on providing foreign currency loans (though at a much diminished rate), 
while Polish-owned banks largely stopped providing such loans, replacing them with local 
currency loans. Foreign-owned banks also closed their liquidity funding gap faster than 
                                                  
4   This was also the case in some central European countries – in particular the Czech Republic and Slovakia – 
in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 (see Mihaljek (2010)).   BIS Papers No 54  45
 
 
domestically owned banks. In particular, at the height of the crisis in Q4 2008, foreign-owned 
banks withdrew earlier than domestic banks from the interbank market, preferring to deal 
with the central bank rather than with other commercial banks. This lack of confidence was 
“imported” from the outside: parent banks apparently instructed their Polish subsidiaries to 
withdraw from the local interbank market. But, on the whole, parent banks did not abandon 
their subsidiaries in Poland or elsewhere in CEE during the crisis (see Mihaljek (2010)). They 
broadly maintained their cross-border credit lines and lending in domestic currency, thus 
acting as a stabilising force during the crisis and demonstrating that these markets were of 
strategic importance to them.  
A related issue is whether parent banks would convert some of their emerging market 
subsidiaries into branches after the crisis. Over the past decade, centralisation of the 
decision-making process in global financial institutions has led to a system in which 
subsidiaries operate more or less like branches. In the European Union, this development 
has been facilitated by the adoption of the single EU banking passport.  
Branch banking often looked more attractive to host country authorities in the past because it 
seemed to provide greater incentives to foreign banks to transfer know-how and technology 
to EMEs. With the crisis, however, the focus of host country authorities has shifted towards 
financial stability issues. This has made subsidiaries more attractive because of the 
possibility of ring fencing their assets and of regulating them more tightly than branches. New 
banking regulations proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) could 
reinforce this trend by raising capital and liquidity requirements for subsidiaries. In CEE, for 
instance, some foreign banks announced that they might turn their subsidiaries into branches 
if the local regulation of subsidiaries’ activities increased significantly after the crisis. 
However, there has also been a movement away from foreign bank branches in some 
countries. In China, the authorities would like foreign-owned banks – which are currently 
present only as branches – to expand their presence in the form of subsidiaries in the future. 
One reason for this was the high concentration of some activities in foreign bank branches: 
with just 2% of total banking system assets, foreign bank branches accounted for 50% of 
derivatives and 18% of FX trading before the crisis. The authorities would like foreign banks 
to commit to the local market, ie to lend and fund their activities in China in the future. 
Malaysia had some positive experience with this approach – by requiring foreign banks to 
operate as subsidiaries, the authorities ensured that banks had a level playing field and 
entered the crisis with sufficient capital. By contrast, the authorities in India were reluctant to 
give foreign-owned banks dominance over some market segments. This could happen if 
foreign banks were granted the full national treatment currently given to domestic banks, ie if 
foreign banks were allowed to turn their branches into subsidiaries.  
In summary, in many EMEs where foreign-owned banks do not play a key role in domestic 
financial intermediation, the differences in the reactions of local and foreign-owned banks to 
the crisis were small and discernible mainly in the details of their funding and lending 
operations. In particular, there have been no noticeable changes in the composition of the 
loan portfolios of the two groups of banks after the crisis. In EMEs, where foreign banks play 
a somewhat bigger role, foreign-owned banks generally adjusted their balance sheets faster 
and more deeply than domestic banks. Finally, in EMEs where foreign-owned banks are the 
dominant financial intermediaries, reactions to the crisis depended on the exposure of parent 
institutions, the financial health of subsidiaries, and the strategic importance of subsidiaries 
for parent banks. In the end, financial stability has been preserved both in those EMEs where 
parent banks fulfilled their support function and those where they withdrew funds from 
subsidiaries. However, as discussed in the accompanying BIS papers prepared for the 
meeting, in both cases, this required some extraordinary efforts on the part of central banks 
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